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Résumé
Cet article étudie la dynamique du compte courant dans le cadre dune grande
économie ouverte, caractérisée par la présence dagents hétérogènes soumis à des
contraintes de crédits ainsi quune politique monétaire endogène. Nous incorporons
trois caractéristiques-clé largement utilisées dans la littérature concernant la Nou-
velle Macroéconomie Ouverte : i) un biais domestique intervenant dans le commerce
extérieur, ii) des rigidités de prix, et iii) des biens durables (logements). An de
limiter la tendance des agents à trop consommer et an dassurer (partiellement)
les créanciers contre le risque de défaut, nous incluons des contraintes de collatéral.
Nous montrons que le degré dimpatience des agents soumis à des contraintes
de collatéral peuvent être à lorigine de déséquilibres extérieurs permanents, notre
modèle ayant un unique équilibre caractérisé par un niveau de dette extérieure
positif.
Notre modèle nous permet danalyser le lien existant entre les taux de change, les
actifs réels et les ux de capitaux internationaux ce qui nous permettra danalyser
la transmission des chocs ainsi que le rôle de la politique monétaire. Par ailleurs,
nous analyserons dans quelle mesure lévolution du marché de limmobilier peut
a¤ecter le compte courant et la dynamique des taux de change.
Codes JEL: E52, F32, F37, F41.
Mots-clés : Dynamique de la dette extérieure ; dynamique du taux de change
réel ; biens durables ; contraintes nancières ; rigidités de prix ; règles de Taylor.
Abstract
In this article, we focus on current account dynamics in large open economies
characterized by debt-constrained heterogeneous agents and endogenous monetary
policies. We incorporate three key features that have bulked large in the New Open
Macroeconomics literature: i) home bias in trade ii) price rigidities and iii) durable
goods (real properties). In order to limit agentswillingness to consume and to
(partially) insure creditors against the risk of default, we incorporate collateral
constraints. We show that the impatience of collateral-constrained agents can be
at the roots of permanent external imbalances. Indeed our model has a unique and
dynamically determinate steady state, which is characterized by a positive level of
debt. Our framework allows us to analyze the linkage between exchange rates, real
assets and international capital ows. We focus on this mechanism so as to track
the (international) transmission of shocks and the implications for the monetary
policy. We show how developments hitting the house market can a¤ect current
account and exchange rate dynamics.
JEL classication codes: E52, F32, F37, F41.
Keywords: open economy, durable goods, collateral constraints, sticky prices,
simple monetary rules.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, agentsaccess to credit has been increasingly limited by col-
lateral constraints. The boom4 of collateral constraints is associated to the devel-
opment of housing nance in several countries. Indeed, during the last 30 years,
housing nance experienced a process of liberalization that introduced more com-
petition and eventually allowed agents to borrow against collaterals.5 Collateral
constraints (partially) insure that in case of default, the creditor can repossess at
least (part of) the asset. This is why they are generally associated to better credit
conditions for borrowers.
At the same time, the increase in house prices in several countries (together
with the development of nancial intermediation) has encouraged agents to extract
equity from the revaluation of their real assets and further borrow against capital
gains. This has eventually entailed the expansion of consumption and household
debt.
Collateral constraints create a link between the value of real assets and aggre-
gate domestic debt; in turn, they create a direct link between uctuations of real
asset prices and debt levels. Notice however that spillovers deriving from hous-
ing nance are not only a purely domestic issue. Indeed, thanks to the globalized
structure of nancial markets, intermediaries can convert mortgages into interna-
tional assets. Both the development of nancial intermediation and the boom of
collateral constraints have thus reinforced also the link between real assets and the
dynamics of international assets.6 Moreover, since household decisions on housing
purchases are a¤ected by interest rate swings, on the one hand, and international
nancial ows by international returns, on the other, collateral constraints have
eventually tightened the mechanism linking real wealth, international capital ows
and exchange rates.
The linkage between agentswealth, exchange rates and the direction of interna-
tional capital ows has proved a very powerful mechanism at the roots of nancial
crises in the emerging world. Krugman (1999) studies the link between currency
depreciation and the wealth of collateral-constrained rms in the context of the
Asian crisis.7 He shows that if rms are collateral constrained and a large share
of their debt is denominated in foreign currency, depreciation has a negative (and
dramatic) impact on the wealth of rms. In turn, as implied by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), the fall in rmswealth, together with debt limits, can lead to a
collapse in investments and in aggregate demand.
In our analysis we extend Krugmans (1999) open-economy "Bernanke-Gertler"
e¤ect to a DSGE framework for the analysis of current account dynamics. This
mechanism is at the roots of the transmission of various stochastic shocks. We fo-
cus in particular on developments a¤ecting agentswealth (i.e., a¤ecting the housing
sector), and their impact on current account and exchange rate dynamics. We track
the response of the economy to demand shocks and to the nancial liberalization
4The share of collateral-constrained agents have increasingly boomed. In US, mortgage debt
has increased from about 60% at the half of the last century to about 90% including veichles.
5 Indeed, housing nance was a highly regulated sector. For a survey on the developments of
housing nance, see IMF (2008).
6 In Figure 1b we show the trends of current account and house prices for a panel of industrial
countries characterized by signicant external imbalances. For those countries, current account
decits show a co-movement with house prices, in the last decade: increasing current account
decits (surpluses) are indeed associated to rising (decreasing) house prices.
7Aghion et al. (2000) provide a supply-driven story with analogous implications.
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in housing nance. Finally, following Ferrero et al. (2008), we analyze the re-
sponse of our two-country world to technology shocks; this will provide a deeper
understanding of the mechanisms driving the dynamics of our model.8
The role of collateral constraints has been widely analyzed in a closed econ-
omy framework. In presence of durable goods, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) extend
the seminal result of Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987) with discounting
heterogeneity to the case of collateral constraints. Their analysis shows that the
steady-state level of debt (wealth) of impatient (patient) agents is dened by the
debt constraint itself; moreover the collateral constraint plays an important role in
transmitting the e¤ects of various shocks to other sectors. Indeed, the "nancial
accelerator mechanism" (see Bernanke et al., 1999) amplies endogenous devel-
opments hitting the credit market. Notice however that when debt contracts are
in nominal terms and monetary policy controls interest rates, ination dynamics
amplify demand shocks but dampen supply shocks working thus as a "nancial
decelerator" (see Iacoviello 2005). The reason is that, with nominal debt contracts,
an increase in ination has a positive e¤ect on debtorswealth and a negative one
of the wealth of borrowers with important implications in light of an optimal
monetary policy (see Monacelli, 2007).
In an open economy framework, Callegari (2007), Punzi (2007) and Matsuyama
(1990)9 study the linkage between housing and current account dynamics. Since
they do not incorporate nominal prices and exchange rates, there is no scope for
them to analyze the role of monetary policy and price rigidities. Analogously,
Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) study the interaction between domestic versus foreign
borrowing in presence of collateral constraints. None of these works analyzes the
above mentioned linkage between exchange rate dynamics, real asset prices and
international capital ows.10
In this essay, we extend Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2007, 2008) New-
Keynesian framework to a two country-world. This framework is very useful to
analyze situations where agents are indebted in equilibrium. We show that, as in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), discounting heterogeneity and debt limits insure that
the collateral constraint is always binding. Moreover, our New-Keynesyan approach
allows analyzing trends of nominal variables and the role of monetary policy. Price
rigidities and the monetary policy stance could indeed play a role in current account
and exchange rate dynamics.11
Eventually, our world economy is characterized by a positive level of external
debt: the stricter collateral constraints, the lower the steady-state level of debt.
Clearly, all shocks that a¤ect house prices require adjusting external debt and
thus, a current account adjustment process. Terms of trade play an important role
8 Iacoviello and Neri (2008) show that technology shocks and housing demand shocks count for
one quarter each of the cyclical volatility of US housing investment and prices. Moreover, they
show how in recent decades demand factors may have played a more prominent role.
9Matsuyama (1990) analyzes the e¤ects of scal policy shocks on the current account. In his
small-economy setting, an increase in government spending represents a negative income shock
for households; it thus dampens their consumption of house services and improves the current
account balance. See also ·Iscan (2002) for an empirical analysis on current account and durables.
10Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) build a model on emerging market crises where they
analyze the interactions between domestic and international collateral constraints on rms with
limited borrowing capacity.
11The IMF suggests in this respect that "..given the imperfect global integration of markets
for goods and services and the rigidities that constrain the reallocation of resources to tradable
sectors, the redistribution of world spending is likely to require considerable movements in real
exchange rates.." (IMF, 2007).
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as a transmission channel of country and sector specic shocks.
The essay is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model and in
Section 3 we analyze the steady state. In Section 4 we focus on the dynamics follow-
ing shocks hitting the housing market while in Section 5 we analyze the behavior of
our model in response to productivity shocks. Section 6 comments the main results
of our analysis while the Appendix provides analytical details and Figures.
2. THE MODEL
This model is built on Monacelli (2007, 2008) and Iacoviello (2005) closed
economies but is developed in a two-country setting. We consider Home and For-
eign respectively (denoted by H and F for simplicity). Both countries are open in
every ways but labor. The inhabitants of both countries have same preferences but
are heterogeneous in their degree of impatience. More precisely, we assume that the
representative inhabitant of country H is more impatient that the one of country
F . S/he is not a consumption smoother but her/his desire to consume is limited
by a collateral constraint. For simplicity, we will denote the inhabitant of country
H as the borrower and the one of country F as the saver.12
Durable goods (real properties) and tradable goods are produced in a monop-
olistic competition framework by domestic and foreign rms; real properties are
non-tradable goods and can be used as collateral. Think for instance of houses:
leaving tourism a part, houses are generally owned by and sold to residents.13
Goods are then purchased and sold to nal consumers by domestic retailers, in a
competitive environment. The representative retailer in the housing sector in coun-
try H (in country F ), buys Home (Foreign)-produced durables only and sell them
to nal consumers in country H (country F ) only. Analogously, the representative
retailer in the tradable sector, buys both Home and Foreign-produced goods to
sell them to nal consumers in the Home (Foreign) country only. Final consumers
enjoy services deriving from durables and consume tradable goods. Finally, agents
can smooth their consumption by exchanging securities on international incomplete
markets; debt in country H is subject to a collateral constraint.
2.1. Retailers
We suppose that intermediate goods are sold in both countries to nal consumers
by an innite set of retailers operating in a competitive environment. Goods mar-
kets in each country are segmented into the tradable and real properties sector. We
will denote by j = T , the representative retailer operating in the tradable sector;
j = n, the representative retailer operating in the durable sector (real properties).
The retailer j = T in country H (in country F ) buys Home and Foreign-produced
tradables and sell them to the Home (Foreign) market. The retailer j = n buys real
properties produced in country H (country F ) and sell them to the Home (Foreign)
market.
2.1.1. Tradables
Consider rst the case of the retailer operating in the tradable sector in country
H. S/he has access to both domestic and foreign-produced goods and sell them
12Notice however that this will be an endogenous result of the model.
13See also Engel and Wang (2008) for some discussion.
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to H nal consumers only. In order to reect consumers preferences, we assume
that the behavior of retailers is a¤ected by home bias.14 Retailers operate in a
perfectly competitive environment and their basket of production is the following
CES bundle:
YT;t =


1
 Y
 1

h;t + (1  )
1
 Y
 1

f;t
 
 1
where  represents the weight of Home produced goods in consumersbundles (in
presence of home bias,  > 0:5) and  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between
Home and Foreign produced goods. For simplicity, from now on we denote all
variables referred to Home (Foreign) goods with the index h (index f). Retailers
demand for respectively Home and Foreign produced goods is the result of an
optimization problem. The CES-related price index of tradables is:
PT;t =
h
P 1 h;t + (1  )P 1 f;t
i 1
1 
(1)
Retailersintermediate demand for Home produced and Foreign produced goods
(Yh;t and Yf;t; respectively) is:
Yh;t = YT;t

Ph;t
PT;t
 
(2)
Yf;t = (1  )YT;t

Pf;t
PT;t
 
(3)
In country F; retailers in the tradable sector behave symmetrically. This implies
that the weight of Foreign produced goods on country F CES production bundle
is the same as the one of Home produced goods in country H15 , i.e.:
Y T;t =

(1  ) 1 Y 
 1

h;t + 
1
 Y
  1
f;t
 
 1
(4)
Prot maximization implies that retailersintermediate demand for foreign and
domestic goods respectively in country F is:
Y h;t = (1  )Y T;t
 
P h;t
P T;t
! 
(5)
Y f;t = Y

T;t
 
P f;t
P T;t
! 
(6)
Notice however that retailers also need to choose amongst the di¤erent (innite)
varieties of domestic and foreign goods, i. We suppose that the Home (Foreign)-
produced basket of the representative retailer is in turn a CES bundle of a contin-
uum of innite varieties of goods, i. Retailers intermediate demand for a single
variety of Home produced (Foreign) good is thus:
14An alternative way to introduce home bias in our model would be to leave the choice between
domestically-produced versus foreign-produced goods to consumers.
15The corresponding price index is: P T;t =
h
(1  )P 1 h;t + P 1 f;t
i 1
1 
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Yh;t (i) = Yh;t

Ph;t (i)
Ph;t
 "
(7)
Yf;t (i) = Yf;t

Pf;t (i)
Ph;t
 "
(8)
where " > 116 ; " > : Analogously, in the rest of the world:
Y h;t (i) = Y

h;t
 
P h;t (i)
P h;t
! "
(9)
Y f;t (i) = Y

f;t
 
P f;t (i)
P f;t
! "
(10)
2.1.2. Durables
Consider now the housing sector. The representative retailer in country H
chooses a set of houses amongst an innite continuum of domestically produced
real properties. Her/his demand for each di¤erentiated good, i, is the result of
prot maximization in a competitive environment 17 , i.e.:
Yn;t (i) =

Pn;t (i)
Pn;t
 "
Yn;t (11)
where " is the elasticity of substitution between single goods, i :18 Analogously, in
the Foreign country, the intermediate demand for real properties of the representa-
tive retailer is:
Y n;t (i) =

P n;t (i)
P n;t
 "
Y n;t (12)
2.2. Optimal consumption in country H
Consider now the representative inhabitant of country H. His/her utility is a
positive function of her/his basket of consumption, Ct and a negative function of
her/his labor supply, Nt i.e.19 :
maxE0
(X
t=0
tU (Ct; Nt)
)
16 In order to keep countries H and F as symmetric as possible, we assume identical elasticities
of substitution across countries.
17Where the CES production bundle of the retailer is: Yn;t 
0@ 1Z
0
Yn;t (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
: The
associated price index is: Pn;t 
0@ 1Z
0
Pnj;t (i)
1 " di
1A
1
1 "
18For simplicity, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between the innite varieties of
Home (Foreign) produced goods is the same for both sectors.
19 In our economy all agents have same preferences and maximize a generic utility func-
tion. In the numerical simulations we will consider the following functional form: Ut =
lnCt  

v
1+'

N1+'t
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where  is the borrowers discount factor. We do not introduce explicitly money
in the utility function and we use it as the numéraire of our cashless economy à la
Woodford.
The representative borrower consumes a bundle that is a CES composite of
tradables and services deriving from the stock of real properties. For simplicity,
we assume that agents start enjoying services deriving from durables in the same
period they purchase them and are proportional to the stock of houses. We also
assume that agents cannot rent/lend houses.20 The borrower consumption basket
is thus:
Ct =
h

1
C
 1

T;t + (1  )
1
 C
 1

n;t
i 
 1
where  is the weight of tradables in the basket and  > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between durable services and tradables. The following assumption on
preferences always needs to hold in both countries:
Assumption 1 (preferences) Uk 2 C2, UkC > 0, UkN < 0, UkCC < 0,
UkCCUkNN > U
2
kCN for every (Ck; Nk) such that Ck; Nk > 0, k =borrower; saver.
Also, Inada conditions for consumption hold.
The individual budget constraint in real terms of tradable consumption is21 :
CT;t + xt (Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1) +Rt 1 bt 1
T;t
 bt + WtNt
PT;t
+
X  
PT;t
(13)
where CT;t represents tradable consumption, Pn;t (Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1) is the cost
of durable expenditure in period t; b are net external liabilities in real terms of
tradable consumption22 , where B  D   qD are net external liabilities in nom-
inal terms, D are home-currency domestic securities, q is the nominal price of
Foreign currency in terms of Home currency and D are foreign-currency Foreign
securities23 . Notice also that xt  Pn;tPT;t is the relative price of real properties
and T;t  PT;tPT;t 1 is the aggregate ination rate in the tradable sector24 : In prac-
tice, in each period the borrower buys tradables, CT ; and real properties; s/he pays
the debt service on her/his debt, where R is the gross nominal interest rate factor.
S/he enjoys resources coming from foreign borrowing, B; labor income, WN and
prots,   coming from their rms (operating in a monopolistic competition frame-
work). Labor is assumed mobile across sectors but not across countries; therefore,
the wage is the same in each sector but not necessarily in each country.
20This implies that CPI ination corresponds to aggregate ination in the tradable goods sector.
21The individual budget constraint in nominal terms is:
PT;tCT;t + Pn;t (Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1) +Rt 1Bt 1
 Bt +WtNt +
X
 
The budget constraint is assumed to hold with equality around the deterministic steady state.
22Notice that bt 1 =
Bt 1
PT;t 1
23See the Appendix for all details concerning the optimization program of the consumer.
24The ination rate in the durable sector is dened as n;t  Pn;tPn;t 1 , while h;t 
Ph;t
Ph;t 1
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Borrowerscapacity to obtain credit is limited by a collateral constraint. We
suppose that households debt is constrained to be a share of the value of their
durables (real properties), and debt contracts are issued in nominal terms, i.e.:
bt  (1  )Cn;txt (14)
where  is the fraction of durables that cannot be used as a collateral and can be
interpreted as the inverse of the loan-to-value ratio: the larger , the more stringent
the constraint. For simplicity, we assume  to be an exogenous parameter of our
model. The role of collateral constraints and the implications of their structure
has been recently analyzed in a New-Keynesian framework by Calza et al. (2006)
in a closed economy framework.25 Eventually, collateral constraints allow agents a
better access to credit. Indeed, they partially ensure the creditor against the risk of
default: in case of default, the creditor can always repossess (part of) the asset.26
In our two-country world, constraint (14) reduces to a limit on international
borrowing. This should not surprise the reader. Since we aim at analyzing current
account dynamics, we are interested in the behavior of aggregate variables, and in
the dynamics of ows (of goods and nancial capital) between countries. In aggre-
gate, the sum of domestically traded assets and liabilities in each country is equal
to zero. Thus, if indebted, our representative agent of each country cannot but
be indebted towards his foreign counterpart only. Indeed, thanks to the globalized
structure of nancial systems, mortgages can be easily converted into international
assets. Our representative agent in each country can thus act as a nancial in-
termediary and sold her/his (collateralized) debt abroad. In this vein, collateral
constraints (and their impact) are transferred to an international dimension.
Notice nally that (14) implies also that an increase in the relative price of real
properties allows agents to increase their level of debt.
The rst order conditions of borrowersoptimization program are:
 UN;t
UT;t
=
Wt
PT;t
(15)
xtUT;t = Un;t +  (1  )Et fUT;t+1xt+1g+ UT;t t (1  )xt (16)
 t = 1  Et

Rt
T;t+1
UT;t+1
UT;t

(17)
Equation (15) represents a standard consumption/leisure arbitrage. Equation
(16) represents the intertemporal demand for tradable consumption relatively to
durables. In equilibrium, the value of the utility deriving to the borrower from
present consumption of tradables needs to equal the value of direct utility deriving
from the direct housing services plus the value of their indirect utility, i.e.: i) the
utility deriving from the possibility of selling real properties and buying durable
consumption in future,  (1  )Et fUT;t+1xt+1g and ii) the marginal utility stem-
ming from relaxing the collateral constraint, and consuming additional non-durable
goods, UT;t t (1  )xt:
Equation (17) represents a modied Euler equation for country H where t t
is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the collateral constraint and t the one
25For more discussion see also Monacelli (2007, 2008), Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and
Hercowitz (2006).
26 In Bernanke and Gertler (1989) they are justied by the presence of private information and
limited liability. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) they are the response to problems of enforcing
contracts.
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associated to the budget constraint. Clearly, it reduces to the standard Euler
equation whenever  t =0. If  t > 0, the marginal utility of current consump-
tion exceeds the gain of shifting intertemporally one unit of consumption (savings):
UT;t > Et
n
Rt
T;t+1
UT;t+1
o
. If this is the case in each period, the representative
agent in country H is not a consumption smoother and nances current consump-
tion with as much credit as s/he can have access to (i.e., the collateral constraint
is binding). Clearly,  t also represents the marginal value of additional debt
27 : by
marginally relaxing the collateral constraint one can have access to more current
consumption.
Finally, one can rewrite (16) as:
Un;t
UT;t
= xt (1   t (1  ))   (1  )Et

UT;t+1
UT;t
xt+1

(18)
Notice that the RHS of equation (18) represents the user cost of durables in terms of
non-durables at time t. It represents the price you pay for the ow of consumption
services from durables during the period; the cost is obviously a positive function of
the interest rate and the relative price of durables (for  t xed). By substituting
(17) in (18) and log-linearizing (18), it is possible to isolate the e¤ect of  on the
user cost, during the dynamics around the steady state, as shown in the Appendix
(its impact on the steady state is also discussed in the Appendix). The impact of
a variation in  on the user cost crucially depends both on the structure of the
collateral constraint and the parametrization. In our framework, it is generally
negative. This implies that a decrease in the marginal utility of borrowing makes
houses less useful and entails a substitution e¤ect in favour of tradables.28
2.3. Exchange rates and terms of trade
In presence of home bias, the law on one price only holds for the single basket
of Foreign produced and Home produced tradables, separately. In practice:
Ph;t = qtP

h;t
and
Pf;t = qtP

f;t
where q is the nominal exchange rate (the Home-currency price of Foreign currency)
and  > 12 implies PT;t 6= qtP T;t:
In addition, in equilibrium, the following relationship between Home and Foreign
net external liabilities always needs to hold:
Bt = qtB

t (19)
where B is Home-currency net external debt in nominal terms and B29 are lenders
net external assets in Foreign currency. Obviously, if B > 0 borrowers are net debtor
and savers are net lenders.
27 can also be interpreted as the price of an asset; indeed, it is tied to a payo¤ that depends
on the deviation from the Euler equation see Monacelli (2007).
28Having said that, for very small depreciation rates, we recover Monacelli (2008) result in
presence of a (slightly) di¤erent collateral constraint. See the Appendix.
29Clearly, B = D
q
 D
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In our two-country simple world, houses cannot be rent. This implies that the
CPI price index coincides with the aggregate price index of tradable goods, PT:30
It is thus straightforward to calculate the CPI real exchange rate of country H as:
t = qt
P T;t
PT;t
For simplicity, from now on when referring to the real exchange rate of H; we
will consider the CPI based real exchange rate.31 Notice nally that in absence of
home bias, the CPI-based real exchange rate is constant in all periods; this would
certainly be at odds with reality (see Figure 1a).
We nally introduce country H terms of trade and we dene them in the fol-
lowing way:
St =
Pf;t
Ph;t
=
P f;t
P h;t
(20)
Symmetrically, country F terms of trade are thus:
St =
Ph;t
Pf;t
=
P h;t
P f;t
= S 1t
The bond market-clearing condition (19) can be rewritten as a function of terms of
trade, i.e.:
bt = bt
 
(1  )S1 t + 
S1 t + 1  
! 1
1 
(21)
2.4. Optimal consumption in country F
We consider now the representative agent of country F . We suppose that agents
in country F are more patient than agents in country H. Thus, the discount rate of
the borrower is strictly lower than the one of country F representative agent (the
saver). Savers maximizes the following utility function:
maxE0
(X
t=0
tU (Ct ; N

t )
)
where  is their discount factor, Nt is labor e¤ort and C

t is a CES composite
good of tradables and services arising from durables. For simplicity, from now on,
all variables referring to the foreign country (and currency) will be indexed by an
asterisk.
Assumption 2 always holds:
Assumption 2 (discounting) ;  2 (0; 1) ; < :
30 Indeed, the CPI basket does not include the price of houses.
31Analogously, in presence of durable goods, Engel and Wang (2008) build a non-utility based
consumption price index. This index is calculated as a weighted average of di¤erent prices
subindexes and is used to compute the real exchange rate of their economy.
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Assumption 2 is crucial in explaining external debt dynamics in our model; it
is not new in international nance.32 Ghironi et al. (2005) introduce heteroge-
neous discounting in an overlapping generation framework33 . More recently, Choi
et al. (2008) track the dynamics of US current account introducing endogenous
heterogeneous discounting.
Saversconsumption basket is composed as the one of borrowers, i.e.:
Ct =
h

1
C
  1
T;t + (1  )
1
 C
  1
n;t
i 
 1
where Cn are services deriving from real properties in the Foreign country and C

T
is a basket of tradables. The budget constraint of the F -agent in real terms of
tradable consumption is34 :
CT;t + x

t
 
Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1
 Rt 1 bt 1T;t   bt + W

t N

t
P T;t
+
X
i
 
P T;t
(22)
where W t are foreign-currency wages in the Foreign country, R
 are nominal in-
terest rates in the Foreign country and   are prots. Finally, B  Dq   D are
Foreign net external assets in Foreign currency and bt are net external assets in
real terms of tradables. Finally, we introduce a no-Ponzi game condition on net
international assets35 :
lim
i!1
Et
bt+i
iY
z=1
Rz
 0 (23)
The rst order conditions of saversoptimization program are:
 UN;t
UT;t
=
W t
P T;t
(24)
UT;tx

t = U

n;t +  (1  )Et

xt+1U

T;t+1
	
(25)
UT;t = Et
(
UT;t+1
Rt
T;t+1
)
(26)
Equation (24) states the standard arbitrage condition between leisure and con-
sumption and equation (25) is the intertemporal demand equation for durables
versus nondurable goods. Equation (26) is a standard Euler equation.
Finally, we need to introduce the relation linking interest rates in country H
and in country F . In order to obtain it, we substitute for gross external assets and
liabilities in the budget constraint of countryH or F (remember that B  D qD).
Rewriting the budget constraint in real terms of tradable consumption and re-
calculating the rst order conditions for the borrower and/or the lender, one can
easily nd the needed condition. It is possible to show (see the Appendix for all
details) that the following modied uncovered interest parity condition needs to
hold:
32Our hypothesis is also consistent with Masson et al. (1994) and Henriksen (2002) who relate
current account dynamics with demographic factors. Analogously, Chinn and Prasad (2000) nd
that demographic factors are signicant determinant of the current account balance.
33For more discussion, see also Buiter (1981) and Weil (1989).
34 It holds with equality around a deterministic steady state.
35This condition does not bind. Analogously, given lenders relative patience, any collateral
constraint imposed on their borrowing would not bind (see the discussion in the following sections).
12
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.65
Rt = Et

qt+1
qt

Rt (27)
The absence of arbitrage possibilities between domestic and foreign assets im-
plies that the marginal utility of investing in Home assets is equal to the one agents
obtain by investing in Foreign assets. Notice nally that given the stochastic setup
of our framework and the assumption of incomplete markets, the uncovered interest
parity condition only holds in expectations.
2.5. Production
We now set the structure of production in our two-country world. For simplicity
we suppose that labor is homogeneous and mobile across sectors in the same country
but not around the world. We assume also that the representative agent in each
country is also the owner of representative rms in each country. Markets in each
country are segmented into tradables and durables (real properties). Firms in both
sectors operate in a monopolistic competition environment and are characterized
by the good they produce.
Real propertiesproducers at Home (in the Foreign country) only sell their goods
to Home (Foreign) markets while tradablesproducers sell them to retailers of both
countries. We suppose that there are i rms producing i non perfectly substitutable
durables (tradable goods). Each rm is characterized by a production function F ,
which depends on labor, Nl and a productivity shifter Al, which is common for all
rms within the same sector, l = h; n (f; n). The following proposition needs to
hold:
Assumption 3 (technology): F is homogeneous of degree 1 with F 2
C2; FN > 0; FNN  0:Moreover F (0) = 0; limN!0 F 0 (N) = +1; limN!1 F 0 (N) =
0:
2.5.1. Tradables
We rst focus the attention on the tradable sector in country H. Firm i pro-
duction function is consistent with Assumption 3 and is dened for simplicity as:
Fi;t(Nh;t (i)) = Ah;tNh;t (i)
Firms maximize the prot function:
E0
( 1X
t=0
0;t
 
Fi;t(Nh;t (i))Ph;t (i) WtNh;t (i)  !T
2

Ph;t (i)
Ph;t 1 (i)
  1
2
Ph;t
!)
given retailersdemand functions.  is the borrowers stochastic discount factor
and:
t;t+1  0;t+1
0;t
 Et

1
1   t
t+1
t
PT;t
PT;t+1

where  is the borrowers Lagrangian multiplier (i.e., the marginal utility of income)
of the representative consumer in country H and
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!T
2

Ph;t (i)
Ph;t 1 (i)
  1
2
Ph;t
are the rms costs associated to adjusting prices (menu costs); following Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), we assume that adjustment costs are quadratic. In practice,
each period rms need to optimally balance the costs arising from resetting prices
and the costs associated to deviating from optimality.
Analogously, the stochastic discount factor of rms in country F is:
t;t+1 
0;t+1
0;t
 Et
(
t+1
t
P T;t
P T;t+1
)
where  is lendersstochastic discount factor and  is the Lagrangian multiplier
associated to the savers budget constraint.
In both countries rms choose their optimal sequence fNh;t (i) ; Ph;t (i)g,
n
Nf;t (i) ; P

f;t (i)
o
:
Nominal and real marginal costs in H (MC and mc, respectively) are:
MCh;t =
Wt
Ah;t
mch;t =
Wt
Ph;tAh;t
(28)
In a symmetric equilibrium: Ph;t (i) = Ph;t:We can thus simply solve for optimal
prices. We obtain the following New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC):
!T (h;t   1)h;t = Fh;t (Nh;t) "

(1  ")
"
+mch;t

+!TEt
8<:

1
1   t

UT;t+1
UT;t
"
+ (1  )S1 t
+ (1  )S1 t+1
# 1
1 
(h;t+1   1)h;t+1
9=;
The standard optimization program of the representative agent implies that in
equilibrium there cannot be gains in exchanging leisure with consumption; the non-
arbitrage condition leisure/consumption (15) needs to hold. Condition (15) can be
here rewritten as:  UN;t
UT;t
=
Wt
Ph;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
therefore, when we substitute it in (28), we obtain:
mch;t =
1
Ah;t
 UN;t
UT;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
(29)
Clearly, terms of trade a¤ects the Phillips curve both in the form of the marginal
cost, and through the discount factor. By incorporating (29) and the relation
Fh;t (Nh;t) = Ah;tNh;t in the above Phillips curve, we obtain:
!T (h;t   1)h;t = Ah;tNh;t"

(1  ")
"
+
1
Ah;t
 UN;t
UT;t

+ (1  )S1 t
 1
1 

(30)
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+!TEt
8<:

1
1   t

UT;t+1
UT;t
"
+ (1  )S1 t
+ (1  )S1 t+1
# 1
1 
(h;t+1   1)h;t+1
9=;
Without price rigidities, the real marginal cost is constant at the mark-up.
Notice also that in the tradable sector, terms of trade create a wedge between
the rate of substitution between consumption and leisure on the one hand, and
the marginal product of labor on the other. The real marginal cost is directly
a¤ected by movements in terms of trade. This creates a scope for policy intervention
whenever the policy-maker aims at optimal policies (for some discussion see Faia
and Monacelli, 2008).
Analogous considerations apply for country F . Marginal costs are:
mcf;t =
1
Af;t
 UN;t
UT;t
h
+ (1  )S 1+t
i 1
1 
(31)
and the NKPC is:
!T
 
f;t   1

f;t = A

f;tN

f;t"
"
(1  ")
"
+

+ (1  )S 1+t
 1
1   UN;t
Af;tU

T;t
#
(32)
+!TEt
8<:UT;t+1UT;t
"
+ (1  )S 1+t
+ (1  )S 1+t+1
# 1
1   
f;t+1   1

f;t+1
9=;
2.5.2. Durables
The price dynamics in the housing sector can be easily individuated by following
the same lines of the previous section. The New Keynesian Phillips curve for
durables (real properties) is:
!n (n;t   1)n;t
= An;tNn;t"

(1  ")
"
+mcn;t

+ !nEt

1
1   t
0;t+1
0;t
(n;t+1   1)n;t+1Pn;t+1
Pn;t

where, again:
t;t+1 =
0;t+1
0;t
= Et

1
1   t
t+1
t
PT;t
PT;t+1

and thus:
!n (n;t   1)n;t
= An;tNn;t"

(1  ")
"
+mcn;t

+ !nEt

1
1   t
UT;t+1
UT;t
xt+1
xt
(n;t+1   1)n;t+1

Also, given the arbitrage consumption-leisure, we can rewrite rmsmarginal costs
in the housing sector as:
mcn;t =
1
An;txt
 UN;t
UT;t
(33)
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Notice that there is a wedge between the ratio of marginal utilities and the
marginal cost. This wedge is created by a variation in the relative price, x. When
the monetary authority aims at implementing an optimal policy, the presence of this
wedge leaves the policy maker a scope for policy intervention (for some discussion
see Monacelli, 2007).
Incorporating (33) in the above New-Keynesian Phillips curve, we obtain:
!n (n;t   1)n;t = An;tNn;t"

(1  ")
"
+
1
xt
 UN;t
UT;tAn;t

(34)
+!nEt

1
1   t

UT;t+1
UT;t
xt+1
xt
(n;t+1   1)n;t+1

Analogously, the NKPC in country F is:
!n
 
n;t   1

n;t = A

n;tN

n;t"
"
(1  ")
"
+
1
xt
 UN;t
UT;tA

n;t
#
(35)
+!nEt
(
UT;t+1
UT;t
xt+1
xt
 
n;t+1   1

n;t+1
)
where real marginal costs are:
mcn;t =
1
xt
 UN;t
UT;tA

n;t
(36)
Notice that we have a priori allowed for the possibility of price rigidities in
the housing sector. Having said that, we will reasonably assume in our benchmark
simulations that house prices are not rigid. Indeed, as Iacoviello and Neri (2008)36
remark, most houses are priced for the rst time when they are sold. Moreover,
since each house is a very expensive good, in case menu costs had a signicant xed
component, the incentive to renegotiate its price would predominate. 37
2.6. Market clearing
2.6.1. Home country
For markets to be cleared in country H; total purchases of real properties need
to equal the total domestic production; they also need to account for the costs
of price rigidities. We remind the reader that in this model real properties are
non-tradable goods. Thus:
An;tNn;t = Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1 + !n
2
(n;t   1)2
Given that labor is not mobile across countries, labor market clearing implies:
Nn;t +Nh;t = Nt (37)
Therefore:
An;tNn;t = Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1 + !n
2
(n;t   1)2 (38)
36See also Barsky, House and Kimball (2007).
37Our simplied framework does not allow to model phenomena related to asset prices bubbles.
Further research should focus on possible ways to introduce price bubbles in the housing sector.
16
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.65
Focus now on the Home sector of tradables. Market clearing requires:
Ah;tNh;t = Ch;t + C

h;t +
!
2
(h;t   1)2
where Ch and Ch are consumption levels of Home tradables at Home and in the
Foreign country, respectively. Notice that local retailers of tradables in country H
operate in a perfectly competitive environment and only sell their products to Home
inhabitants (in practice, they simply act as aggregators). Therefore, the market of
Home-produced tradables clears when the total amount of produced goods equals
the aggregate demand of retailers. In practice, Ch;t = Yh;t; Ch;t = Y

h;t; CT;t =
YT;t: Recalling that retailersdemand for domestically and foreign produced goods
are respectively, Yh;t = YT;t

Ph;t
Pt;t
 
and Yf;t = (1  )YT;t

Pf;t
Pt;t
 
the market
clearing condition for the tradable sector can be rewritten rst as:
Ah;tNh;t = YT;t

Ph;t
PT;t
 
+ (1  )Y T;t
 
P h;t
P T;t
! 
+
!
2
(h;t   1)2
and then as a function of terms of trade, i.e.:
Ah;tNh;t = Ct;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 
1 
(39)
+(1  )Ct;t
h
(1  ) + S1 t
i 
1 
+
!T
2
(h;t   1)2
2.6.2. Country F
Given the symmetric structure of our world economy, market clearing conditions
for country F have a symmetric structure to that of country H: Market clearing
conditions for country F are listed in the following.
Labor market clearing requires:
Nn;t +N

f;t = N

t (40)
Market clearing in the non-tradable sector requires:
An;tN

n;t = C

n;t   (1  )Cn;t 1 +
!n
2
 
n;t   1
2
(41)
Finally, market clearing in the tradable sector implies:
Af;tN

f;t = (1  )CT;t
h
S 1t + (1  )
i 
1 
(42)
+CT;t
h
S 1t (1  ) + 
i 
1 
+
!
2
 
f;t   1
2
2.6.3. Budget constraints and current account
If monopolistic rms are owned by the inhabitants of the country in which
they are located, the resources-expenditure balance of the borrower is given by the
budget constraint (13), holding with equality around a deterministic steady state.
Therefore, by substituting for real prots and for (39) and (38) in the borrowers
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budget constraint, the resource constraint of the representative agent in country H
is:
(1  ) CT;tS
1 
t
+ (1  )S1 t
  (1  )CT;t
h
1  + S1 t
i 
1 
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
(43)
= bt  Rt 1 bt 1
T;t
Equation (43) shows that the inows of foreign resources net of interest payments
(the RHS) needs to equalize the consumption of tradables at Home, net of Foreign
consumption of tradables (weighted for terms of trade). Equation (43) is also
the current account equation for country H. More explicitly, we dene the current
account of country H (in real terms of home tradable consumption) as the variation
of home-currency assets (in real terms of tradable consumption)38 , i.e.:
cat =

bt 1
T;t
  bt

(44)
cat = xtAn;tNn;t +Ah;tNh;t
Ph;t
PT;t
  CT;t   xt (Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1) (45)
 bt 1
T;t
(Rt 1   1)  1
PT;t
h
Pn;t
!
2
(n;t   1)2 + Ph;t!
2
(h;t   1)2
i
Clearly, by substituting An;tNn;t and Ah;tNh;t with (38) and (39) and equating (44)
and (45) we obtain equation (43).
In the rest of the world, the corresponding resource constraint is:
CT;t
S 1t (1  )h
S 1t (1  ) + 
i  Rt 1 bt 1T;t 1 (46)
=  bt + (1  )CT;t
h
S 1t + (1  )
i 
1 
h
(1  )S 1t + 
i 1
1 
Equation (46) can be also interpreted as a current account equation of country
F .
2.7. Monetary policy
The recent house prices boom and the prospect of a global downturn as a con-
sequence of sharp softening in housing sectors have triggered a debate on wether
policy makers should respond to house prices. Conventional mainstreams agree
that central bankers should respond to asset price changes only when they a¤ect
ination, output and expectations (Mishkin, 2007). However, there are "benets to
be derived from leaning against the wind...(and)..increas(e) interest rates to stem
38 In our numerical simulations, we will focus on the ratio of the current account over GDP.
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the growth of house price bubbles and help restrain the building of nancial imbal-
ances" (IMF, 2008).39
There is also a general agreement on the desiderability to target ination only
in the sectors where prices are stickiest.40 In this light, by letting prices free to
move in the exible-prices sectors, the monetary authority avoids output swings in
the sticky-price sectors to stabilize the overall price index.
While refraining from normative issues, we limit our analysis to the e¤ects of
stochastic shocks in presence of alternative policy stances. In our framework, we as-
sume that exchange rates are completely exible and policy makers do not engage
in any specic exchange rate policy. This leaves the central bank three possi-
ble targets: durable goods ination, tradable goods ination and/or domestically-
produced tradablesination. In the following, when focusing on the response of
the economy to shocks, we will track the adjustment dynamics with di¤erent Taylor
rules.
In our simplied exercise, we assume that the policy maker does not aim to
stabilize output. Clearly, as remarked by Iacoviello (2005) in a similar framework,
output targeting may be a source of possible policy trade-o¤s. For the moment
we suppose that each policy maker react both to durables and home-produced
tradablesination according to the following Taylor rules:
Rt
R
=

h;t
h
1;h n;t
n
2;h
(47)
Rt
R
=
 
f;t
f
!1;f 
n;t
n
2;f
(48)
In a two country setup, nominal determinacy requires 1 and/or 2 to be
su¢ ciently large; we assume that the monetary policy is set so as to ensure su¢ cient
conditions for nominal determinacy (see Benigno and Benigno, 2000). Notice nally
that the above simple rules are not e¢ cient: any change a¤ecting the natural
interest rates will likely entail an inationary/deationary bias.
2.8. Equilibrium conditions
For each monetary policy in country H and F , the equilibrium of our world
economy is dened by (13) and (14) holding with equality around the deterministic
steady state (see discussion in the following section), (15), (16),(25), (24), (26),
(17), (27) and the no-Ponzi game condition, (23)41 . In the tradable production
sector, (30) and (32) need to hold while in the durables production sector (34) and
(35). Market clearing is insured by (37)-(43) and (19). Finally purchasing parity
conditions need to hold.
3. STEADY STATE
In this section we focus on the qualitative features and the dynamic proper-
ties of the steady state. Once we have proved the existence of a "well behaving
39For more discussion on house prices and monetary policy targets see Borio and White (2004),
Bordo and Jeanne (2002).
40See Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004).
41Given the collateral constraint, the no-Ponzi game condition is not binding.
19
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.65
equilibrium", it is possible compute it analytically (see the Appendix).
3.1. Dynamic properties of the steady state
In order to show the existence of a determinate steady state and on its features
we rst shift our attention to the (modied) steady-state Euler equations of our
model.
Consider rst equations (26) and (58) see the Appendix at the steady state.
Notice also that in steady state, T = T (where  is the steady-state depreciation
rate of the nominal exchange rate). Indeed terms of trade are xed in steady state.
Also, long-run values of tradable ination coincide with the target of the monetary
policy for tradables in the Home and in the Foreign country, respectively. We can
thus pin down the long-run value of  ; i.e.:
 = 1  

(49)
implying that
1 >  > 0 (50)
whenever 0 <  < 1: Notice however that since 1 >  >  > 0; inequality (50)
always holds. Eventually, Assumption 2 reduces to the Becker (1980) and Becker
and Foias (1987, 1994) condition (see the following Proposition).
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1-3 and a monetary policy that insures
nominal determinacy, if the system is su¢ ciently close to the deterministic steady
state, then bt = (1  )Cn;txt for every t  0:
Proof. The formal proof is in Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987, 1994)
with zero-borrowing constraints. In order to ensure the existence of a "dominant
consumer" in this model, we need to focus on (modied) Euler equations. Given
that the saver is a consumption smoother, the ratio of her/his steady-state marginal
utilities is equal to one, i.e.:
UT;t
UT;t+1
= Rt

T;t+1
= 1 (51)
at the contrary, equation (17) shows that whenever at the steady state 0 <  < 1;
0 < 1   Rt
T;t+1
UT;t+1
UT;t
and the borrower is thus the "dominated consumer". Indeed, Assumption 2 ensures
that 0 <  < 1:
Proposition 1 implies that in our framework the borrower is always debt-constrained.
Indeed, given that the Lagrangian multiplier  is positive, the constraint must be
binding.42
42See also Iacoviello (2005) for additional discussion.
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In addition, Proposition 1 states that there exists an unique steady state, which
is characterized by a non-zero level of external liabilities. The steady state is also
dynamically determinate. It follows that the steady state of our system is not
characterized by unit roots. Indeed, as in the standard model of Becker (1980), the
steady state is determined by the Euler equation of the patient agent and does not
depend on initial conditions. Also, external debt is uniquely pinned down by the
collateral constraint. Proposition 1 allows thus to introduce the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If Proposition 1 holds, the dynamics of our two-country econ-
omy with heterogeneous agents and imperfect nancial markets are not characterized
by unit roots.
The above Corollary needs some comments. Indeed, the pioneer analysis of
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) shows that when markets are incomplete, the steady
state of an open economy is generally subject to unit roots. This means that the
steady state depends on initial values (i.e., initial external assets/liabilities) and
transient shocks have long-run e¤ects.
In a two-country framework, Cole and Obstfeld (1991) rule out unit roots under
particular functional forms for utility. Analogously, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) in-
troduce an unitary elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.43
This specication provides full risk sharing, renders securities redundant and im-
plies a zero current-account balance for every period, also in presence of home bias.
In turn, a zero current-account balance refrains transitory shocks from having long-
run e¤ects.
Alternatively, the non-stationarity of the steady state is ruled out by Cavallo
and Ghironi (2002) and Ghironi (2006) in a framework of overlapping generations;
in their model, zero steady-state liabilities are an endogenous result. Still in a
framework of overlapping generations, Ghironi et al. (2005) introduce heteroge-
neous discounting and extend this result to the case of non-zero long-run external
liabilities; in this setting, the possibility for the (relatively more) patient agent to
hold all capital in steady state is ruled out by the absence of intergenerational be-
quest. This result should not surprise the reader; empirical evidence (see Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2002) show that non-zero long-run external assets/liabilities
are a common phenomenon.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) provide a detailed analysis on stationarity-
inducing methods to rule out unit roots in a small-economy framework.44 The
proposed modications to the standard model aim at inducing stationarity of the
equilibrium dynamics: they make the steady-state independent from initial con-
ditions. However, when stationarity is induced by portfolio adjustment costs or
interest rate premia, long-run external assets that need to be set exogenously. In-
deed there is an exogenous level of debt around which the adjustment function is
centered. When stationarity is induced by endogenous discounting, the discount
factor function is centered around an exogenous steady-state level for consumption.
In Becker (1980) seminal article, the steady state is endogenously dened by
the Euler equation of the "dominant consumer" (i.e., the patient agent) and it is
independent from initial conditions. By extending Becker (1980) seminal result to
43For a literature review see Lane (2001).
44Bodestein (2006) provides an analogous analysis applied to a two-country world.
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the case of a two-country framework, we also rule out unit roots. Indeed, in steady
state, the Euler equation only depends on the parameters of the model. This result
implies that (su¢ ciently small) stochastic shocks do not have long-run e¤ects and
the steady state is not subject to unit roots dynamics.45
Notice nally that these results do not depend neither on nominal rigidities
neither on the introduction of durables.
4. CURRENT ACCOUNT DYNAMICS AND HOUSING MARKET
SPILLOVERS
The recent swings in house prices and their dramatic consequences have trig-
gered a debate on the implications for the global economy. Indeed, the current
degree of nancial globalization has likely enhanced the international transmission
of shocks. In a recent article on the sustainability of US current account and the
dollar, Krugman (2007) discusses the linkage between the value of the dollar and
the housing sector. He provides a stylized analysis on the e¤ects of a fall of both
housing prices and the value of the dollar; nally, he evaluates the implications of
the monetary policy stance.
In our analysis we are not interested in evaluating the sustainability of cur-
rent trends. Instead, we incorporate Krugmans (2007) message so as to explore
the transmission mechanisms of shocks arising from the housing market. Indeed,
as mentioned in the Introduction, the linkage between international capital ows,
exchange rate and the wealth of collateral-constrained agents has proved a fun-
damental transmission mechanism in the context of currency crises in emerging
countries. While extending the focus to uctuations in housing wealth, we extend
the application of the open-economy "Bernanke-Gertler" e¤ect to the analysis of
current account dynamics.
In this section, we study the impact of developments a¤ecting the housing mar-
ket and their implications for the dynamics of international variables. We will rst
analyze the e¤ect of likely stochastic shocks a¤ecting consumption. As in Ferrero et
al. (2008), preference shocks are here meant to capture structural factors entailing
changes in consumption patterns.46
Finally, in order to proxy the recent nancial liberalization, we introduce a
(very) persistent stochastic shock a¤ecting the tightness of the collateral constraint
and we see how this a¤ect current account and exchange rate dynamics.
4.1. Calibration47
In order to have a quantitative insight of the dynamics of the model, we proceed
by simulating the response of our economy to stochastic shocks. Our parametriza-
tion is consistent with the recent literature and is based in particular on Monacelli
(2007, 2008), Obstfeld and Rogo¤(1995, 2000, 2004) and Faia and Monacelli (2008).
45The steady state is globally unique. Having said that, the dynamic properties of the steady
state hold only around the steady state itself. The reason is that the dynamic properties can-
not but be calculated by inspecting the Jacobian matrix (and thus, after linearization). Same
considerations apply for the stability properties of the model (see Becker and Foias 1997)
46 Iacoviello (2005) introduces preference shocks so as to proxy temporary tax advantages or
sudden increases in demand for houses fuelled by optimistic consumer expectations. In the same
vein, Krugman (2007) considers a shock in investorsexpectations.
47For more details on IRFs, see also the Appendix (Section 7.4.1).
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Quarterly discount factors are set respectively to  = 0:99 and  = 0:98:48 The
structure of the model implies that the real interest rate of the F country is pinned
down by the discount factor of the dominant consumer, and thus is equal to 1 :
We stick on Monacelli (2007) benchmark value for houses depreciation rate and
we set  = (0:025)1=4, which is consistent an annual depreciation between 1,5% and
3%. Analogously, we adopt the average loan-to-value ratio on home mortgages for
the period 1952-2005 in U.S. and let  = 0:25:49
We calibrate  by assuming that the share of durable spending on total spending
in Home,

Cn
Cn+CT

; is equal to 0:2. This is consistent with U.S. data on spending.
We calibrate v by assuming that the steady state level of labor in F is one third
of one unit of time; so as to proxy European trends; the inverse elasticity of labor
supply is assumed to be equal to 3.
The elasticity of substitution amongst single varieties (for each sector in each
country) is set equal to 8. This implies a mark-up of about 15%. The elasticity of
substitution between the basket of home and foreign goods is reasonably assumed
to be lower than 8 and is set equal to 2. Moreover, the share of Home (Foreign)
good consumption in the Home (Foreign) country, ; is set equal to 0:7.
In our benchmark parametrization, we follow the standard literature on sticky
prices adjustment and we assume a frequency of four quarters for tradable goods.50
4.2. Demand shocks
We now focus the attention on the possible e¤ects of two di¤erent demand
shocks: i) a positive shock in preferences for housing in the debtor country, H (so
as to proxy the demand shock for houses in countries characterized by great amount
of net external liabilities); a positive shock on preferences for tradables in country
F (so as to proxy a generalized ination boom). Indeed, as suggested by Iacoviello
and Neri (2008), demand shocks have played a major role in explaining the cyclical
volatility of houses and prices in recent years.
4.2.1. Demand shock in the housing sector
Suppose now that country H is a¤ected by a positive shock in consumerspref-
erences such that its inhabitants desire to buy more houses. For simplicity, we
suppose that the shock has a log-normal distribution such that51 :
pn;t = npn;t 1 + ut
ut  (iid)
where we let n = 0:85, following the calibration of Iacoviello (2005).
We see that in response to an increase in householdsappetite for real properties,
the nancial accelerator is at work. The increase in the stock of real assets and
thus, in housing relative prices entails a better access to credit.52 Since agents
48Caroll and Samwick (1997) estimate discount factors to be in a range between 0.91 and 0.99.
49 It is also consistent with current trends in industrial countries, see IMF (2008).
50See Bils and Klenow (2004) and Monacelli (2007) for some recent discussion on the frequency
of price adjustment in U.S.
51The utility function is thus: maxE0
P
t=0 
tUt
 
epn;tCn;t; CT;t; Nt
	
52 Indeed, the marginal value of borrowing,  ; decreases.
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in country H are impatient, they use all their collateral to obtain credit. In turn,
this allows them to consume tradables and to further increase their stock of houses:
external debt increases on impact and continues to gradually accumulate before the
shock is absorbed. The accumulation of collateral is accommodated by a gradual
decrease in the user cost of durables. By inspecting equation (18)  see also the
Appendix , one can see that the user cost of durables is a positive function of
both the interest rate and the relative price of durables.53 Both relative prices and
interest rates jump on impact and decrease gradually.
Given the expansion of debt, interest rates increase; notice in particular that
in absence of nominal rigidities, the interest rate and the level of ination are
determined by the Taylor rule together with the modied Euler equations of the
borrower. Indeed, the central bank reacts to the expansionary e¤ects of the shocks
by tightening interest rates.
Notice in particular that in our two-country world, developments a¤ecting hous-
ing prices are transmitted internationally through terms of trades. The transmission
channel is evident in absence of prices rigidities. If prices are exible, real marginal
costs need to be constant in each period. In our case, given an identical mark-up
for all sectors54 and mobile labor across sectors, it always needs to hold:
1
xt
 UN;t
UT;tAn;t
=
("  1)
"
=
1
Ah;t
 UN;t
UT;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
(52)
implying that the increase in housing relative prices entails an improvement in
terms of trade. Eventually this will transmit the e¤ect of the shock to country F .55
Borrowers enjoy thus a positive income e¤ect. As you can see in (52), the
decrease in S enhances the consumption of tradables. Moreover, the decrease in
the relative price of foreign goods prompts borrowers to substitute Home with
Foreign tradables consumption; this switching e¤ect entails a trade decit. The
trade decit together with a (quantitatively small) increase in interest payments
triggers the insurgence of a current account decit.
Thanks to the income e¤ect, aggregate labor supply does not increase on impact
in country H (as expected, it does increase in country F ): indeed, the positive
income e¤ect deriving from the improvement in terms of trade o¤sets the increase
in aggregate consumption in H. Aggregate labor gradually increases as soon as
terms of trade start deteriorating, before of the absorption of the shock.
Notice in particular that we have assumed that debt contracts are stipulated
in nominal terms. In a closed economy framework, Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli
(2007) show that an increase in ination implies a shift of resources in favour of
the borrower. In our framework, the impact of shocks on ination is a¤ected by
terms of trade. In turn, the impact of terms of trade on the ination index of
tradables is generally not uniquely signed. Indeed, terms of trade a¤ect both the
Home-produced tradables ination56 and the CPI index of ination, according to
denition (1) and (20).57 Clearly, if CPI ination rises, real interest payments
decrease.
53For a focus on the role of  , see the above discussion: See also Monacelli (2008) with a similar
(but not identical) collateral constraint.
54Clearly, qualitative results would hold also with di¤erent mark-up.
55For a more detailed discussion on the trasmission of shocks between countries, see the following
section.
56Marginal costs in the Home tradable sector are a positive functon of terms of trade
57 In response to the preference shock for housing T < h, if prices are exible: However, if
prices of tradable goods are sticky, the opposite is true and T > h:
24
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.65
The fall in terms of trade plays a double role in response to the shock: on the
one hand, by making Foreign consumption cheaper, it accommodates borrowers
impatience and willingness to increase current consumption. On the other hand,
it enhances lenders accumulation of Foreign currency assets and thus, their fu-
ture investment incomes  we remind the readers that lenders are consumption
smoother. Notice indeed that the amount of Foreign external assets is a negative
function of terms of trade, according to (21). This is due to a revaluation e¤ect
of lendersassets. Notice that the structure of our two-country world is charac-
terized by the fact that borrowers do not lend; therefore, borrowersnet external
liabilities coincide with their gross external liabilities. In turn, given that borrow-
ers debt is denominated in Home currency, assets revaluation e¤ects associated
to exchange rate swings are ruled out.58 Conversely, given that lenders are not
indebted and their holdings of gross and net external assets coincide, their wealth
is subject to revaluation e¤ects associated to exchange-rate uctuations. As you
can see in Figure 2, the fall in S has a positive impact on Foreign external assets,
which is associated to the initial appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Notice
also that given home bias, the improvement of terms of trade is associated to a
real appreciation in the rst period; indeed, the (nominal and real) exchange rate
undershoots on impact so as to depreciate during the adjustment process. At the
end of the adjustment, the nominal exchange rate is eventually more depreciated
than its pre-shock value.
The current account decit is eventually absorbed as a consequence of the grad-
ual decrease in borrowerstradable consumption on the one hand; and the decrease
in borrowersability to access to credit, on the other.
To conclude, the above results show that in response to a preference shock
for durables, the increase in house relative prices is transmitted internationally
through an improvement in terms of trade: house prices and terms of trade move in
opposite directions. Borrowers experience a current account decit; the exchange
rate appreciates on impact and depreciates throughout the adjustment. Notice
interestingly that these trends are consistent with US data on current account,
house prices and exchange rates during the last years. Around 2005, the US have
experienced a steeper increase in house prices, a temporary undershooting of the
exchange rate and a deterioration of the current account (see Figure 1a, 1b).59 Our
results are consistent with Iacoviello and Neri (2008). According to their empirical
analysis, during the 2000-2005 period, housing preference shocks played a major
role in explaining the boom in housing investments and prices in US.
Nominal rigidities In Figure 3, we show the e¤ect of the above shock in pres-
ence of di¤erent types of price rigidities. We compare the dynamics of variables
when tradables have a 4 quarter frequency in price adjustment (case 1 in Figure
3), with the case of price exibility (case 2) and the case where only house prices
have a 4 quarter frequency in price adjustment (case 3).
Figure 3 shows that the scenario characterized by price exibility is intermediate
between the other two. The main e¤ect of price rigidities lies in their impact on
the relative price durables-tradables.
58 In presence of Home-denominated debt and foreign denominated assets, revaluation e¤ects on
foreign assets can have a signicant impact on the dynamics of external debt. For some discussion,
see, among many others, Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Iliopulos and Miller (2007), Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (2004), IMF (2005a).
59Clearly, to drive any conclusion more empirical work would be needed.
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If tradables are sticky, the relative price of durables jumps higher than when
prices are exible because the price of tradables does not immediately adjust to the
expansionary e¤ect of the shock. Notice that since the prices of durables are here
kept exible, it still needs to hold: 1xt
 UN;t
UT;tAn;t
= (" 1)" : In the tradable-goods sector
ination is now pinned down by the New Keynesian Phillips curve, (30). Therefore,
terms of trade and the relative price of durables are no more directly linked; still,
they continue to move inversely. Following the jump in x, terms of trade improve
but in a smaller extent (indeed, the price of Home produced goods increase more
slowly).
Following the stronger jump in relative prices, the user cost of durables jumps
higher; thus, agents a¤ord a smaller amount of real properties. Having said that, the
increase in the value of houses allows them to continue borrowing so as to increase
consumption; there is thus a switching e¤ect in favour of tradable consumption.
Notice however that the dynamics of the current account are not a¤ected by price
rigidities; indeed, the switching e¤ect in favour of tradable consumption is o¤set by
the smaller extent of the switching e¤ect in favour of Foreign tradables (due to the
weaker improvement of terms of trade). Finally the e¤ects of price rigidities are not
quantitatively relevant for the dynamics of the real exchange rate60 . As in Ferrero
et al. (2008), the behavior of real-international variables do not di¤er signicantly
from the exible-case scenario: they depend mainly on real factors.
Monetary policy We now focus on the role of monetary policy. We choose to
assume the perspective of the Home central bank; we aim at investigating the e¤ects
of di¤erent targets on the dynamics of our collateral-constrained open economy.
Given the structure of our two-country two-sector economy, policy makers in each
country can choose alternative targets: tradable goods ination, Home-produced
goods ination and durable-goods ination.
We consider the following alternative simple monetary rules:
Rt
R
=

h;t
h
1;h
;1;h !1 (53)
Rt
R
=

T;t
T
1;h n;t
n
2;h
(54)
Rt
R
=

T;t
T
1;h
;1;h !1 (55)
together with the benchmark rule, (47). According to rule (53) (i.e., scenario 2 in
the simulations of Figure 4), the monetary authority stabilizes ination of Home
produced goods only (i.e., 2;h = 0 and 1;h is large). According to rule (54),
scenario 3, the central bank targets both CPI-ination and ination in the housing
sector. Notice however that this specication implies that the monetary authority
directly targets also the ination of imported goods; in this way, s/he directly
responds to shocks that may be imported from abroad.61 Finally, when the central
bank follows rule (55), scenario 4, s/he responds to tradable (CPI) ination but
disregards the trends of house prices.
60However, price rigidities in the tradable sector introduce larger swings in the nominal exchange
rate.
61One could think of commodities such as oil. For instance, by targeting core ination, the Fed
does not directly respond to the increase in oil prices.
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In Figure 4, we show the adjustment dynamics following a preference shock for
housing under the likely scenario where the prices of tradables are sticky in both
countries.
When the policy maker implements rule (55) aggregate tradable ination is
best stabilized, together with terms of trade. Therefore, most of the weight of the
adjustment of the shock is carried by the relative price of houses, x (on impact it
jumps higher). This implies that, on impact, agents a¤ord a smaller amount of
durables; having said that, they can a¤ord more tradable consumption  thanks
to a stronger wealth e¤ect related to the increase of value of their assets and a
switching e¤ect in favour of tradable consumption. Notice however that the impact
of the shock on the current account is not signicantly di¤erent from the one in
the other scenarios. Indeed, given the smaller improvement in terms of trade, the
stronger switching e¤ect in favour of tradable consumption is o¤set by a weaker
switching e¤ect in favour of Foreign consumption.
Notice nally that when the central bank targets housing prices, ination is gen-
erally less stabilized in all baskets of goods.62 Given that we have assumed exible
house prices, this result conrms the desirability of targeting stickiest prices only.
The monetary policy is indeed less e¤ective in stabilizing the e¤ects of preference
shocks even if interest rates rise higher. In addition, as in Iacoviello (2005) and
Monacelli (2007), targeting house prices does not signicantly improve the adjust-
ment of real (international) variables; the current account (in real terms of tradable
consumption) is not signicantly a¤ected by the introduction of house prices in the
Taylor rule. Moreover, when the central bank targets also housing ination, the
nominal and real exchange rate experience larger swings.
4.2.2. Demand shock for tradables in country F
The two-country structure of our model prompts us to analyze the transmission
of shocks from one country to the other. In this section we focus on the transmission
of a positive demand shock from country F to H.
Suppose that country F is a¤ected by positive demand shock for tradables. For
simplicity, we suppose that the shock has a log-normal distribution such that:
pT;t = T pT;t 1 + ut
ut  (iid)
where we let T = 0:85, as above.
63
Focusing rst on F , we see that, as expected, the positive shock triggers a strong
increase in tradable consumption.
If prices are exible, real marginal costs in each sector need to be equal to the
mark up. This needs to hold in each period. We have assumed for simplicity the
same mark-up for all sectors64 , therefore:
62Moreover, when the central bank implements rule (53), aggregate tradable ination is more
volatile but the single baskets of durable ination and Home tradables are better stabilized. This
implies that the relative price of houses is (slightly) better stabilized. The nominal interest rate
increases less, leading in turn to smaller swings in the nominal exchange rate.
63Lendersutility function is thus: maxE0
nP
t=0 
tUt

Cn;t; e
pT;tCT;t; N

t
o
64 If mark up are not identical, results wouldnt qualitatively change.
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In a closed economy, the term
h
+ (1  )S 1t
i 1
1 
would be equal to 1 and the
relative price x would be xed.65 . In our framework, both x and S represent a
wedge and are allowed to accommodate the shock by moving proportionally.
Figure 5 shows that the preference shock for tradables makes relative prices,
xdecrease; this entails a proportional fall in S.66 Notice that the decrease of both
variables leaves consumption and labor less scope for jumping dampening thus
the expansionary e¤ect of the shock on tradable consumption. Eventually, a de-
crease in x also dampens the substitution e¤ect between durables and non-durables
following the shock in preferences. Indeed, given that lenders are not collateral
constrained, all shocks a¤ecting the real price of durables can entail a strong sub-
stitution between goods see the arbitrage equation, (25).
The variation in terms of trade transmits the shock to country H. Focusing
now on country H; we see that the variation of S implies a variation of x in the
opposite direction with respect to x:
1
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 UN;t
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 UN;t
UT;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
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The decrease in S entails a positive income e¤ect for borrowers and triggers an
increase in tradable consumption, CT . Eventually, the shock is also transmitted
to the relative price, x; which moves opposite to S. This adds a positive wealth
e¤ect on borrowerscollateral. Borrowers can thus obtain more credit and further
increase their level of consumption. Surprisingly, the e¤ect of the preference shock
in country F has thus an expansionary e¤ect on borrowersconsumption. Thanks
to the strong income e¤ect, tradable consumption in country H (slightly) increases
more than aggregate labor in the tradable sector.67 However, countryH experiences
a temporary (small) trade surplus price e¤ect. The Home central bank reacts thus
promptly to keep this expansionary e¤ect under control; then, interest payments
together with the increase in terms of trade entail a (small) current account decit
which is slowly absorbed.68
If prices are exible, the dynamics of interest rates and ination can be pinned
down by combining the modied Euler equations with the Taylor rules. Given
that the simple monetary rules used by policy makers are not e¢ cient, ination
is allowed to jump. The nominal exchange rate accommodates the stance of both
policies and the real exchange rate co-moves with terms of trade: it (slightly)
appreciates on impact and depreciates during the adjustment. In steady state, the
nominal exchange rate is more depreciated with respect to its the pre-shock level.
65See Monacelli (2007).
66 In country F , the Taylor rule triggers a jump in interest rates. This makes current consumption
more expensive and gives the lenders an incentive to accumulate more assets (partly o¤setting
the e¤ect of the shock). The accumulation of assets is in turn enhanced by the revaluation e¤ects
associated to the change in S:
67 Indeed, the decrease in terms of trade has a negative income e¤ect for lenders; this prompts
them to supply more labor.
68Even if tradable consumption decreases more than labor in the tradable sector. Clearly, the
quantitative impact of the shock on both UT;t (and thus, CT ) and UN;t (and thus N) depends on
the parameters of the utility function.
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The shock on preferences makes lenders increase their tradable consumption
on impact but deteriorates their terms of trade contributing to a (small) current
account decit for country F . Then, the increase in interest rate payments, together
with the gradual increase in terms of trade entails a current account decit for
country H. The current account decit is eventually balanced when the e¤ect of the
variation in interest incomes and the increase of country H tradable consumption
are absorbed.
Nominal rigidities In order to investigate the transmission of the shock in
presence of nominal price rigidities we consider the following scenarios: exible
prices (case 1 in Figure 6a, 6b); nominal rigidities for Home tradables only (case
2); nominal rigidities for Foreign tradables only (case 3); nominal rigidities for both
Home and Foreign tradables (case 4).
Figure 6a and 6b shows that at a qualitative level, the impact of the shock in
country F depends on the existence of nominal rigidities in country F : the dynamics
of case 1 (3) are indeed analogous to those of case 2 (4) but the impact of rigidities
is quantitatively very small. If prices are rigid in country F , the dynamics of the
relative price of durables, x and of terms of trade, S are still linked. However,
agents expectations and sectorial ination create a wedge between the dynamics
of the two variables  following the New Keynesian Phillips curve, (32). In the
tradable sector, f cannot jump and most of the pressure of the expansion falls
on the non-tradable sector. As a consequence, relative prices, x experience larger
uctuations  and terms of trade decrease less: There is a quantitatively small
substitution e¤ect in favour of durables when the relative price of houses is lower.
As expected, the e¤ect of the shock on the relative price of durables in coun-
try H depends on price rigidities in country H (see Figure 6b).69 The shock will
be eventually transmitted on tradable and durable consumption through the rela-
tive price of durables, x: the higher the relative price, the smaller the amount of
purchased houses.
We notice that the introduction of nominal rigidities has a very small quantita-
tive e¤ect on current account and exchange rate dynamics.
Monetary policy We now focus on the role of the monetary policy. We continue
assuming the perspective of the Home policy maker and we analyze the e¤ects of
a demand shock for tradables when the policy maker implements rules (47), (53)-
(55), respectively. Notice however that given our focus on shocks a¤ecting country
F , we allow the central bank in country F to modify her/his benchmark Taylor
rule.70
Figure 7 shows the response of variables to a preference shock for tradables in
country F; when the central bank follows di¤erent monetary rules. Notice that the
above transmission mechanisms apply also here; however, changing the monetary
69 In country H, the dynamics of case 1 (2) are indeed analogous to those of case 3 (4) and the
impact of rigidities is quantitatively very small.
70 In particular, whenever country H does not target house prices (this correspond to case 2 and
4 in the numerical simulations), the central bank in country F follows the simple benchmark rule:
Rt
R
=
 
f;t
f
!1;f
; 1;f !1 (56)
Notice however that trends in H would not be signicantly a¤ected if country F continued using
the benchmark rule (47).
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rule has quantitatively smaller implications. Rule (47) and (54) have very similar
implications. When instead rule (55) and (56) are implemented, terms of trade
are better stabilized and large part of the adjustment is carried by a jump in the
relative price of houses, x: This entails a stronger increase in tradable consumption
and a stronger fall in the consumption of durables. This e¤ect is o¤set by a smaller
switching e¤ect in favour of Foreign consumption. Smaller amounts of interest pay-
ments entail a smaller current account decit during the adjustment. The current
account follows the line of these trends when the central bank implements rules
(53) and (56).
Notice nally that when the policy maker targets house prices also, interest
rates react more strongly, entailing larger nominal exchange rate swings (this is
consistent with the above results71). In turn, higher interest rates entail larger
interest payments and thus, a (slightly) larger current account decit during the
adjustment.
4.3. Financial liberalization
In this Section we focus on the e¤ects of nancial liberalization. We aim at
proxying the liberalization process that characterized housing nance during the
last decades.72
In our simplied framework, we proxy the process of nancial liberalization
as a loosening of collateral requirements. In particular, we introduce a stochastic
(very persistent) shock hitting the share of real properties that can be used as a
collateral, (1  ) : Increasing this share allows agents to access larger amounts of
credit. Following the same lines of the previous sections, we assume that the shock
of nancial liberalization has a log normal distribution such that:
lt = llt 1 + ut
ut  (iid)
where we let T = 0:99. In Figure 8a we show the adjustment dynamics when
benchmark Taylor rules are implemented and prices of tradables are rigid. If the
collateral constraint is loosened, the marginal value of borrowing,  decreases. To
the contrary, the marginal utility of durable consumption increase together with
their relative price, x73 ; thus, the user cost of durables increase so that agents a¤ord
smaller amounts of houses and substitute durable with tradable consumption.74
The positive wealth e¤ect on borrowersassets adds on the loosening of the collateral
constraint; therefore, borrowers can further increase their level of debt (remember
that borrowers are not consumption smoother). In turn, this boosts consumption.
The above transmission channels imply that the increase in house relative prices
translates into an improvement in terms of trade75 . Borrowers enjoy thus also a
71Analogously, targeting house price also is not e¢ cient: on inmpact, ination jumps higher in
all baskets except for house prices.
72The liberalization of both international nancial markets and housing nance took di¤erent
forms and followed diverse patters in di¤erent coutries. IMF (2008) provides an index proxying
the degree of liberalization of mortgages markets in a panel of countries.
73Notice however that prices increase both in the tradable and in the nontradable sector.
74See the above discussion on the impact of  on the user cost of durables; see also the Appendix.
75 In response to the shock, if all prices are exible, T < h; if tradables prices are sticky,
terms of trade dampen tradable ination on impact (i.e., T < h) but enhance ination during
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positive income e¤ect that further enhances their level of (tradable) consumption.76
Country H experiences the insurgence of a trade decit that is at the roots of a
current account decit. Moreover, interest payments increase and add on the de-
terioration of the current account. Indeed, the reaction of the central bank to the
expansionary e¤ect of the shock triggers an increase in interest rates in country H.
The exchange rate undershoots on impact and depreciates during the adjustment.
In steady state, the nominal exchange rate is more depreciated with respect to the
initial situation. Notice nally that the dynamics of the current account, exchange
rates and house prices are qualitatively similar to the dynamics following a pref-
erence shock for housing. Having said that, the current account decit implied by
a preference shock for tradables is quantitatively more signicant (comparison not
shown in the simulations).
As in the previous section, price rigidities do not have an important e¤ect on
international real variables77 . Indeed, the current account decit is not signicantly
a¤ected by price rigidities; as in the previous section, price rigidities entail a larger
jump in the relative price of houses, associated with a smaller improvement in terms
of trade. Therefore, the stronger switching e¤ect in favour of tradable consumption
is o¤set by the weaker switching e¤ect in favour of foreign tradables (see Figure
8b).
Finally, in Figure 8c we show the impact of di¤erent simple monetary rules; as
you can notice, the e¤ects follow the same logic of the previous sections; as for the
preference shock for houses, the current account is not signicantly a¤ected by the
monetary policy stance (but the nominal and the real exchange rate are).
5. QUANTITATIVE INSIGHTS AND DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL
In this Section we will continue exploring the dynamics characterizing our model.
We will rst analyze the e¤ect of an aggregate technology shock in country F and
its transmission to country H. We will then focus on an aggregate shock in country
H so as to compare the adjustment dynamics of the two countries.
5.1. Aggregate technology shock in country F
Suppose that country F is a¤ected by a positive aggregate technology shock;
the shock we consider hits both housing and the tradable production sector so
that productivity coe¢ cients Af ; A

n increase in the same way. As in the previous
sections, we suppose that the productivity shock has a lognormal distribution, such
that:
af;t = aaf;t 1 + ut
ut  (iid)
the rest of the adjustment (i.e., T > h)  dampening in turn real interest rates (in terms of
tradable consumption).
76The shock has a negative impact on aggregate labor in country H and a positive e¤ect on
aggregate labor in country F .
77As expected, price rigidities entail relatively larger swings in the nominal exchange rate.
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and we suppose for simplicity Af;t = A

n;t = e
af;t :78
In response to a positive technology shock in country F , lenders increase savings
(i.e., net external assets), consumption79 and work less in the tradable sector.80
At the same time, the decrease in marginal costs makes Foreign goods cheaper;
therefore, S decreases81 .
When prices are exible, 1xt
 UN;t
UT;tA

n;t
=
h
+ (1  )S 1t
i 1
1   UN;t
Af;tU

T;t
; thus,
house relative prices decrease.
The fall in terms of trade has a negative e¤ect on saversincome (and a positive
e¤ect on their net external assets) and makes Home consumption more expensive.
Terms of trade, labor supply and consumption show an hump-shaped trend. This
depends on the following o¤setting e¤ects: i) the direct e¤ects of the shock on the
variables (entailing an increase in F -tradable consumption, a decrease in S and
and in F -labor supply) and ii) the feedbacks associated the negative income e¤ect
implied by the fall of terms of trade in the rst period (See also equation (42))
The shock is thus transmitted to country H entailing a positive income e¤ect
for borrowers; tradable production in country H decreases but tradable consump-
tion is sustained by imports. Since 1xt
 UN;t
UT;tAn;t
= 1Ah;t
 UN;t
UT;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
,
the e¤ect of terms of trade is transmitted to relative house prices82 and enhances
borrowerscollateral. The nancial accelerator is thus at work. The hump-shaped
trend of consumption follows both the trends of terms of trade and of house relative
prices (the latter, through the nancial accelerator channel).83
In country F , the productivity shock triggers a fall in ination; there is thus
scope for a monetary loosening. Notice also that the shock in F entails a (smaller)
fall in ination also in country H; indeed, marginal costs in H are a negative func-
tion of relative house prices and a positive function of terms of trade. Thus, the
e¤ects associated to the changes in relative prices more than o¤sets the quanti-
tatively (very) small increase in aggregate labor. Interest rates in country H are
eventually determined by combining the Taylor rule with the Euler equations.
Focusing now on the international transmission of the shock, notice that the
improvement of terms of trade triggers a trade decit for country H (see Figure 9c).
On impact, country H also experiences a current account decit. Having said that,
the decrease in interest payments eventually allows country H to carry a current
account surplus throughout the adjustment. The nominal exchange rate appreciates
on impact and depreciates throughout the adjustment. Same considerations apply
for the real exchange rate. In the long run, the nominal exchange rate is more
depreciated than in the pre-shock situation.
The positive technology shock in country F entails thus an improvement of
borrowersterms of trade and an increase in house prices. During the whole ad-
78We assume that a = 0:85: Engel and Wang (2008) estimate the coe¢ cient related to a
productivity shock in the non-durable sector only to be equal to 0.87 and the one in the durable
sector as 0.9.
79Moreover, the associated loosening of the monetary policy prompts agents to consume more
see the following.
80Clearly, quantitative results depend on the paramenters of the model.
81The e¤ect is eventually enhanced by an appreciation of country-H nominal exchange rate.
82Notice that house prices do not increase; housing relative prices increase because the price of
the aggregate basket of tradables decreases more.
83Terms of trade trigger the transmission of the shock. The transmision channel depends on a
positive net e¤ect on borrowers income. Indeed, aggregate consumption increase in country H
and labor swings are quantitatively insignicant.
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justment process, borrowers experience a trade decit. However, while on impact
they also experience a (quantitatively not signicant) current account decit, de-
creasing interest payments help sustaining a current account surplus throughout
the adjustment (see Figure 9c).
Finally, in Figure 9a and 9b we show the e¤ect of nominal rigidities for tradables
on the transmission of the shock. Price rigidities do not seem to signicantly a¤ect
the international transmission of technology shocks. As in the above analysis,
price rigidities introduce a wedge on relative prices entailing quantitatively small
consumption switching e¤ects.84
5.2. Aggregate technology shock in country H
Suppose now that country H is a¤ected by a positive aggregate technology
shock; as in the previous section, the shock we consider hits both the housing and
the tradable production sector so that productivity terms Ah; An increase in the
same way. As in the previous sections, we suppose that the shock has a lognormal
distribution, such that:
ah;t = aah;t 1 + ut
ut  (iid)
and we suppose for simplicity Ah;t = An;t = eah;t :85 In response to a positive
productivity shock, borrowers increase their level of consumption and decrease their
labor e¤ort. In Figure 10a we compare the response of output and labor when either
country H or F are subject to a positive productivity shock. Given that borrowers
do not save and are impatient, the e¤ect on consumption and on labor e¤ort is
stronger in country H; for the same reason, aggregate output in H increases in a
smaller extent.
In response to a productivity shock in H, domestic goods become cheaper than
Foreign ones. This entails an increase in terms of trade and borrowers experience
thus a negative income e¤ect. This e¤ect is transmitted to house prices; if prices are
exible, 1xt
 UN;t
UT;tAn;t
= 1Ah;t
 UN;t
UT;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
: Therefore, the increase in
terms of trade entails also a negative wealth e¤ect on borrowersreal assets. These
two e¤ects partly o¤set the impact of the productivity shock on labor. Thus,
labor e¤ort show an hump-shaped response (see Figure 10a) and terms of trade
respond in turn following an analogous trend see equation (39). The decrease in
houses relative prices makes houses less expensive and allow a better access to real
properties.86 The access to foreign credit allows borrowers to increase consumption
above output (see Figure 10b) so that interest payments accumulate. There is thus
a strong upward pressure on prices due to the increase in terms of trade and the
decrease of house relative prices; for this reason (together with the strong upward
84 If central banks do not target house prices, the current account initially falls stronger. More-
over, during the adjusment country H experiences a smaller current account surplus due to a
smaller fall in interest rates and interest payments (see Figure 9d).
85As above, we assume that a = 0:85
86Having said that, the marginal value of borrowing,  ; decreases together with increasing
external borrowing.
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pressure on consumption) ination increase in all sectors.87 Indeed, the downward
pressure on prices due to the shock is more than o¤set by these e¤ects.88 The
central bank needs thus to (slightly) tighten interest rates.
On impact, country H experiences a trade decit that is at the root of a cur-
rent account decit; during the adjustment, the trade decit translates into a trade
surplus (at the roots of a current account surplus). There is a positive correlation
between terms of trade and the real exchange rate; the (real and nominal) ex-
change rate depreciates on impact and makes Home goods cheaper; it appreciates
during the adjustment. At the end of the adjustment, the nominal exchange rate
is appreciated with respect to the initial level.
Finally, as expected, price rigidities do not a¤ect the current account. While
a¤ecting the relative price of houses, they induce a small switching e¤ect in favour
of tradable consumption; however, since terms of trades rise relatively higher, there
is a switching e¤ect in favour of Home-produced tradables (see Figure 10c).89
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have focused on the current account dynamics of a two-country world pop-
ulated by heterogeneous agents in their degree of impatience. We have shown that
if the inhabitants of country H are more impatient than the ones of the Foreign
country, and their willingness to consume is limited by a collateral constraint, we
can extend Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987) seminal result to an open-
economy dimension. Indeed, given that the H-inhabitants are not consumption
smoother, they always prefer to borrow as much as possible and the collateral
constraint is binding in each period. In the long run, the collateral-constrained
country is characterized by a positive amount of external debt and a balanced cur-
rent account; non-zero liabilities are thus an endogenous result of our model and
are consistent with a dynamically determinate steady state.
We have then analyzed the e¤ect of shocks and their international transmission.
While considering the developments of housing wealth, we have in practice extended
the application of Krugman (1999) open-economy "Bernanke-Gertler" e¤ect to the
analysis of current account dynamics. The dynamics of our model have shown
the transmission channel that links developments a¤ecting the housing sector to
current account and exchange rate dynamics. House prices and terms of trade are
linked; therefore, all shocks a¤ecting house prices are transmitted internationally.
Conversely, all shocks entailing a change in terms of trade a¤ect the housing sector.
Interestingly, the co-movements that we have individuated in response to likely
shocks  emphasized by Iacoviello and Neri (2008)  seem to be in line with US
recent trends. Further research should focus on an empirical validation.
87Both Ph and Pn increase in country H. However, since terms of trade entail a stronger
increase in PT ; house relative prices fall. Notice that the increase of Home currency foreign prices
is mostly due to the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
88Notice that, everything else xed, terms of trade keep aggregate tradable ination higher
(T > h). This keeps interest payments lower and partly o¤sets the negative income e¤ects.
89The e¤ect of di¤erent monetary stances are analogous. Having said that, when the monetary
policy implements rule (55), the nominal interest rate jumps less, entailing a smaller nominal
depreciation. Terms of trade are better stabilized and the consumption of Foreign tradables is
thus enhanced. However, this e¤ect on trade is o¤set by a switching e¤ect in favour of durable
consumption; the latter is triggered by a decrease in relative house prices.
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We have also studied the role of price rigidities. As in Ferrero et al. (2008),
price rigidities do not signicantly a¤ect the trends of real international variables:
while entailing larger swings in the nominal interest rates, they dont signicantly
a¤ect the current account.
Finally, we have focused on the monetary policy stance. Our study extends
the results of Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2007) in an open-economy frame-
work; indeed, targeting house prices does not improve the adjustment dynamics of
(international) real variables such as the current account. However, consistently
with Ferrero et al. (2008) our results show that targeting exible prices (i.e., house
prices) can induce larger swings in nominal interest rates and in the nominal ex-
change rate.
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7. APPENDIX
7.1. The detailed optimization program of the borrower.
Utility function:
maxE0
(X
t=0
tU (Ct; Nt)
)
Complete budget constraint, in nominal terms:
PT;tCT;t+Pn;t (Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1)+Rt 1Dt 1 qtRt 1Dt 1  Dt qtDt+WtNt+
X
 
where D are the bonds issued at Home in Home currency and D are bonds issued
in the Foreign country in Foreign currency. The individual budget constraint in
real terms of tradable consumption is:
CT;t + xt (Cn;t   (1  )Cn;t 1) +Rt 1 dt 1
T;t
  qtRt 1dt 1
P T;t 1
PT;t
(57)
 dt   qtdt
P T;t
PT;t
+
WtNt
PT;t
+
X  
PT;t
Using price index denitions, and the law of one price, (57) can be rewritten as:
The collateral constraint is:
dt   qtdt
P T
PT;t
 (1  )Cn;txt
First order conditions:
a) Arbitrage leisure/consumption:
UT;t = t
b) Arbitrage tradable consumption/durable services:
xtUT;t = Un;t +  (1  )Et fUT;t+1xt+1g+ UT;t t (1  )xt
c) Modied Euler equation
1 = Et

UT;t
UT;t+1
T;t+1
Rt

(1   t)

b) Optimal condition for foreign securities:
1 = Et

UT;t
UT;t+1
qt
qt+1
T;t+1
Rt

(1   t)

(58)
Equations (57) and (58) implies that the following non-arbitrage condition needs
to hold, i.e.:
Rt = Et

qt+1
qt

Rt
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7.2. The user cost of durables during the transition
We now aim at disentangling the impact of each component of the RHS of (18)
on the user cost of durables, during the transition toward the steady state. We thus
log linearize equation (18) so as to solve for the log deviations of variables. Let the
log deviation of the user cost be denominated as Z^t. Then:
Z^t = (x+
)
x^t
Z
+(A+
)
 ^t
Z
+(  +A)
Et f^T;t+1g
Z
+(A+  )
Et fx^t+1g
Z
  R^t
Z
(A+  )
where we dene:
A   (1  ) Tx
R

    (1  )x
     (1  ) Tx
R
Moreover, variables without time index are steady-state values and hatted variables
are variables in log deviation from the deterministic steady state. We also notice
that in steady state:  = 1   :
Results show that:
i) An increase in x has a positive e¤ect on the user cost (as expected) as long
as:
x [1   (1  )] > 0
which is comfortably satised with our benchmark parametrization.
ii) An in crease in both Et f^T;t+1g and Et fx^t+1g has a negative e¤ect on the
user cost as long as
 xT
R
(1  ) (1   ) < 0
which is comfortably satised with our benchmark parametrization (and for any
reasonable ones).
iii) An increase in the nominal interest rate entail an increase in the user cost
as long as
 xT
R
(1  ) (   1) > 0
which is comfortably satised in our benchmark parametrization (and for any rea-
sonable ones).
iv) An increase in  has a negative e¤ect on the user cost as long as:
 x
h
(1  ) T
R
  1 + 
i
< 0
which is satised with our calibration. This implies that an increase in the marginal
value of borrowing makes agents substitute tradables in favor of houses. Relative
prices and  have thus opposite e¤ects on the user cost (for everything else xed).
Notice however that for  ! 0; this result is reversed and we recover Monacelli
(2008) result with a slightly di¤erent collateral constraint. Moreover, if we impose
the following constraint:
bt = (1  ) (1  )Et

Cn;txt+1
T;t+1
Rt

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as in Monacelli (2008), the impact of an increase in  t pushes up the user cost of
durables as long as
x (1  ) [T   (1  )n] > 0
which is comfortably satised with our benchmark parametrization. This has im-
portant implications for consumption patterns, see Monacelli (2008).
7.3. Steady state: analytical solution
We now explicitly calculate the steady state of our model. Long term ination
levels are dened by the target of the monetary policy (we assume that n = n =
T = T = 

f = h = 1) and the savers discount rate pins thus down both the
real rate of return in F , RR = 1 and  = 1   , as in Monacelli (2007).
In steady state, the price rigidities à la Rotemberg are no more at stake; the
steady state of our framework coincides with the exible prices steady state. Mar-
ginal costs are thus equal to the mark up. Assuming for simplicity the same mark-up
for all sector in both countries,
mcn = mch = mc

f = mc

n =
"  1
"
(59)
Supposing for analytical simplicity that the elasticity of substitution between
tradables and houses  is unitary90 , the consumption aggregator assumes a Cobb-
Douglas specication; conditions (59), (29) (31) (33), (25), (36) and (16) allow us
to pin down the durable and non-durable level of consumption both at Home and
in Foreign and relative prices x and x:
Cn =
(1  )
vN'
e1
a1
(60)
CT =
"  1
"

vN'

+ (1  )S1   11  (61)
x =

+ (1  )S1   11  (62)
Cn =
(1  )
vN'
e1
a2
(63)
x =

+ (1  )S 1  11  (64)
CT = e1

vN'

+ (1  )S 1  11  (65)
where e1 = " 1" ; a1 = 1   (1  )   (1  ) and a2 = 1   (1  ) : Notice that
in steady state the amount of borrowersreal properties is a positive function of the
marginal value of additional borrowing,  : Indeed, the greater the value of borrow-
ing, the larger the amount of collateral agents are wiling to hold. Analogously, the
smaller the inverse of the loan-to-value ratio, the larger the amount of steady-state
durables. Given the higher service they provide as collateral, agents have a stronger
incentive to hold them in the long run.
90We will keep this simplication during the simulation of our model.
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Substituting (60) and (62) in (14) we obtain the steady-state level for net ex-
ternal debt in Home:
b = (1  ) (1  )
vN'
e1
a1

+ (1  )S1   11  (66)
and the one in Foreign:
b = b

(1  )S1  + 
S1  + 1  
 1
1 
We pin down steady-state levels for Nh; Nn and N by substituting (60) and
(62) in (37),(38) and(39); i.e.:
Nh = e1

vN'

+ (1  )S1  1 (67)
+(1  ) e1 
vN'

(1  ) + S1  1 
[+ (1  )S 1] 11 
Nn = 
(1  )
vN'
e1
a1
(68)
N = Nh +Nn (69)
The terms of trade, S, are pinned down by substituting all above steady-state values
in (43).
An analogous procedure allows us to nd all Foreign steady-state values, i.e.:
Nn = 
e1
a2
(1  )
vN'
(70)
Nf = (1  ) e1

vN'

S 1t + (1  )
 
1 
(+ (1  )S1 ) 11 
(71)
+e1

vN'

+ (1  )S 1 1
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7.4. Figures
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Figure 1a: Trends in the nominal and e¤ective CPI exchange rate
(BIS database)
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Australia, CA/GDP
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
198
5
198
5
198
6
198
7
198
8
198
8
198
9
199
0
199
1
199
1
199
2
199
3
199
4
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
6
200
7
Figure1b. House prices and current account
(Ecowin database)
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Figure 2: Preference shock for houses in H, exible prices:
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Figure 3: Preference shock for houses in H, di¤erent price rigidities.
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Figure 4: Preference shock for houses in H and Taylor rules.
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Figure 5: Preference shock for tradables in country F , exible prices.
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Figure 6a: Preference shock for tradables in country F ,di¤erent price rigidities:
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Figure 6b: Preference shock for tradables in country F ,di¤erent price rigidities:
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Figure 7: Preference shock for tradables in country F and Taylor rules.
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Figure 8a: Increase in nancial liberalization.
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Figure 8b: Increase in nancial liberalization, di¤erent price rigidities.
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Figure 8c: Increase in nancial liberalization, di¤erent Taylor rules.
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Figure 9a: Aggregate productivity shock in country F , price rigidities in country
F .
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Figure 9b: Aggregate productivity shock in country F , price rigidities in country
H.
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Figure 9c: International transmission of an aggregate technology shock in country
F .
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Figure 9d: International transmission of an aggregate technology shock in coun-
try F and Taylor rules.
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Figure 10a: Aggregate productivity shocks in country H and F , respectively.
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Figure 10b: Aggregate productivity shock in country H .
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Figure 10c: Aggregate productivity shock in country H; price rigidities in country
H.
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Figure 10d: Aggregate productivity shocks in country H and Taylor rules.
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7.4.1. Notes on impulse response functions and calibration:
Numerical simulations represent the response of the economy following shocks
of 1% standard deviation; time is in quarters. Impulse response functions represent
percentage deviation from the steady state (if not otherwise specied ). dq refers
to the depreciation rate of nominal exchange rate while realdq to the depreciation
rate of the real exchange rate. cagdp refers to the ratio CA/GDP; rb represents
real interest payments in the Home country and rb represents interest incomes
in country F . yh refers to the domestic production of Home tradables and yf
represents the Foreign production of Foreign tradables. All other symbols reect
the notation in the text.
Figure 2. Calibration: 1;h= 2;h = 1;f = 2;f =1. All prices are here
exible.
Figure 3. Calibration: 1;h= 2;h = 1;f = 2;f =1. Prices are exible in
country F . Variables indexed with 1 refer to the case of price rigidities in the
tradable sector, in country H; variables indexed with 2 refer to the case of price
exibility in both sectors; variables indexed with 3 refer to the case of price rigidities
in the housing sector, in country H.
Figure 4. Calibration: 1;f = 2;f =1 always. Nominal rigidities for tradables.
Case 1 refers to 1;h = 2;h = 1, benchmark Taylor rule. Case 2 to 1;h=10, 2;h =
0, where 1;h is associated to Home produced tradables: Case 3 to 1;h=2;h =1,
where 1;h is associated to the aggregate ination index of tradables; case 4 to
1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h is associated to the aggregate ination index of
tradables.
Figure 5. Calibration: 1;h = 2;h = 1;f = 2;f =1. Flexible prices in both
countries.
Figure 6a. Calibration: 1;h= 2;h = 1;f =2;f =1. Case 1 refers to exible
prices; nominal rigidities for Home tradables only refer to case 2; nominal rigidities
for Foreign tradables only refer to case 3; nominal rigidities for both Home and
Foreign tradables refer to case 4.
Figure 6b. Calibration: 1;h= 2;h = 1;f = 2;f =1. Case 1 refers to exible
prices; nominal rigidities for Home tradables only refer to case 2; nominal rigidities
for Foreign tradables only refer to case 3; nominal rigidities for both Home and
Foreign tradables refer to case 4.
Figure 7. Nominal rigidities for tradables. Case 1 refers to 1;h=2;h = 1,
benchmark Taylor rule. Case 2 to 1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h is associated to
Home produced goods and the Foreign central bank does not target house prices,
2;f = 0: Case 3 to 1;h=2;h =1, where 1;h is associated to the aggregate
index for aggregate tradable ination; case 4 to 1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h is
associated to aggregate ination index for tradables and the Foreign central bank
does not target house prices;2;f = 0.
Figure 8a. Calibration: 1;h=2;h = 1;f=2;f =1. Price rigidities in the
tradable sector in both countries.
Figure 8b. Calibration: 1;h=2;h = 1;f=2;f =1. Case 2 corresponds to
price rigidities in the tradable sector; case 1 corresponds to the benchmark exible
prices in both countries.
Figure 8c. Nominal rigidities for tradables in both countries; 1;f = 2;f =1
always. Case 1 refers to 1;h=2;h = 1, benchmark Taylor rule. Case 2 to
1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h is associated to Home produced goods: Case 3
to 1;h=2;h =1, where 1;h is associated to the aggregate index of ination for
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tradables; case 4 to 1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h is associated to aggregate trad-
ables.
Figure 9a. Calibration: 1;h= 2;h = 1;f =2;f =1. In case 2, prices are rigid
in the tradable sector, in country F . In case 1, all prices are exible.
Figure 9b. Calibration: 1;h= 2;h = 1;f =2;f =1. In case 2, prices are rigid
in the tradable sector, in country H. In case 1, all prices are exible.
Figure 9c. Calibration: 1;h= 2;h = 1;f =2;f =1. All prices are exible.
Figure 9d. Nominal rigidities for all tradables. Case 1 refers to 1;h=2;h = 1,
benchmark Taylor rule. Case 2 to 1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h is associated
to Home produced goods and the Foreign central bank does not target house
prices;2;f = 0: Case 3 to 1;h=2;h =1, where 1;h is associated to the aggregate
ination index of tradables; case 4 to 1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h is associated
to the aggregate ination index of tradables and the Foreign central bank does not
target house prices;2;f = 0:
Figure 3.10a. Calibration: 1;h = 2;h = 1;f =2;f =1. All prices are exible.
Variables referring to country H show the response to a productivity shock in
country H; variables referring to country F refer to the response of a productivity
shock in country F .
Figure 10b. Calibration: 1;h=2;h = 1;f =2;f =1. All prices are exible.
Figure 10c. Calibration: 1;h=2;h = 1;f =2;f =1. In case 2, prices are rigid
in the tradable sector, in country H. In case 1, all prices are exible.
Figure 10d. Nominal rigidities for tradables; 1;f=2;f =1. Case 1 refers to
1;h =2;h = 1, benchmark Taylor rule. Case 2 to 1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h
is associated to Home produced goods and the Foreign central bank does not target
house prices;2;f = 0: Case 3 to 1;h=2;h =1, where 1;h is associated to the
aggregate ination index of tradables; case 4 to 1;h=10, 2;h = 0, where 1;h
is associated to the aggregate ination index of tradables and the Foreign central
bank does not target house prices;2;f = 0:
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